

ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE FACE OF MIGRATION, CYBERATTACKS, AND POLITICAL CRISES

Łukasz BOJARSKI

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ABSTRACT

In the scientific article, an attempt is made to conceptualize economic security under the overlapping conditions of illegal migration, cyberattacks, and political crises, which create interdependent vectors of risk within a fluid geopolitical order. The aim of the scientific article is to outline an analytical framework grounded in the Polish school of security studies—with reference to the work of Jan Maciejewski, Małgorzata Stochmal, Marian Cieślarczyk, Andrzej Pieczywok, and Janusz Gierszewski—and situated at the intersection of the sociology of politics and the sociology of crises. The analysis is based on theoretical and critical analysis of the subject literature, complemented by systems and comparative approaches characteristic of sociological security studies.

The mechanisms of the instrumentalization of migration within the logic of hybrid warfare and their effects on public finances, the labor market, and human capital are analyzed by the author of the scientific article. Particular attention is paid to the escalation of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and financial systems, which reprofile the macroeconomic risk map and compel investment in cyber-resilience and business continuity management. The author also attempts to link political instability with disruptions to supply chains—especially in critical raw materials and rare earth minerals—which intensify the transmission of price and exchange-rate shocks.

In the financial dimension, it is shown that the effectiveness of open market operations and monetary policy transmission channels is constrained by heightened transaction and counterparty risks and by exchange-rate volatility; stress tests based on hybrid scenarios, supply-source diversification, and the development of digital competencies are advocated. In conclusion, it is indicated that the war in Ukraine and US–China tensions—with active roles played by India, the EU, and Russia—constitute a “new normal” of uncertainty, requiring the integration of migration, digital, and financial policies, as well as the continued promotion of Polish scholarly contributions

KEYWORDS

geopolitical order; economics; rare earth minerals; illegal migration; cyberattacks; human capital; sociology of politics; sociology of crises; sociology of risk.



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INTRODUCTION: Economic Security as a Sociological Category

In the second and third decades of the twenty-first century, the notion of security has undergone profound redefinition. Its semantic field has expanded far beyond the military domain to include social, informational, and economic dimensions. Within this new configuration, economic security emerges as a strategic category that encapsulates the stability, resilience, and adaptive capacity of national economies exposed to complex transnational pressures. The overlapping crises of illegal migration, cyberattacks, and political instability have revealed the multidimensional character of economic security, transforming it from an abstract concept of state policy into a tangible determinant of everyday life.

In order to ground this analytical perspective more firmly, it is necessary to situate the concept of economic security within a broader theoretical framework. Such a framework is provided by the Polish school of security studies, which offers an interdisciplinary and sociologically informed understanding of security as a systemic and relational phenomenon.

Research Methods

The article employs research methods appropriate to theoretical studies in the fields of security studies and sociology. The primary research method is theoretical analysis combined with critical analysis of the subject literature, including the scholarly contributions of the Polish school of security studies (among others, Jan Maciejewski, Małgorzata Stochmal, Marian Cieślarczyk, Andrzej Pieczywok, and Janusz Gierszewski).

In addition, the method of systems analysis is applied in order to demonstrate the interdependencies between migration, cyberthreats, and political crises as components of a single system of economic risk. A comparative method is also employed, enabling the juxtaposition of different types of threats and their consequences for the economic stability of the state. Furthermore, an interpretative-sociological method is used to reconstruct the meanings of economic security under conditions of global uncertainty.

Theoretical Foundations of Economic Security Analysis in the Polish School of Security Studies

The Polish school of security studies has made a distinctive contribution to the conceptualisation of this phenomenon, emphasizing the interdisciplinary synthesis of sociology, economics, and political science. As Jan Maciejewski has argued, the modern understanding of security requires analytical categories that connect individual experience with systemic functionality, revealing how macro-level threats manifest as micro-level vulnerabilities. (Maciejewski, 2025, pp.45-26) In this view, economic security cannot be reduced to fiscal indicators or market performance; it must be understood as a dynamic process of safeguarding the material foundations of social order under conditions of uncertainty.

This sociological orientation is shared by Marian Cieślarczyk, who has long advocated an integrated approach linking economic, cultural, and moral dimensions of security. According to Cieślarczyk, security is “a holistic property of social systems, dependent on both their material resources and their axiological coherence” (Cieślarczyk, 2011, p. 73). In other words, the economic stability of a state depends not only on GDP or balance-of-trade figures but also on the integrity of its institutions, the trust of its citizens, and the quality of its human capital. The erosion of these intangible assets—through corruption, disinformation, or demographic decline - represents as grave a threat to economic security as inflation or recession.

The analytical framework developed by Małgorzata Stochmal adds yet another layer to this understanding. In her studies on security systems and crisis management, Stochmal emphasises that modern risk is systemic rather than episodic: it arises from the interdependence of technological, political, and social processes (Stochmal, 2020, pp.27-34). In this perspective, illegal migration, cyberattacks, and political crises are not isolated events but interconnected vectors of destabilisation. Each amplifies the others through feedback loops of mistrust, misinformation, and market reaction. Economic security, therefore, must be conceptualised not as the absence of risk but as the capacity to absorb and adapt to cascading shocks.

Andrzej Pieczywok, developing the Polish theory of security culture, situates economic security within the broader category of strategic security culture – a pattern of values, behaviours, and institutional practices that shape a society’s response to threats (Pieczywok, 2015, pp.18-23). His work highlights that resilience is not solely technical or economic but also normative. A society that lacks a culture of responsibility, foresight, and solidarity is incapable of maintaining economic security even when equipped with advanced technologies or large financial reserves. The ability to manage crises thus becomes inseparable from the capacity to reproduce shared meaning and trust across economic institutions and political systems.

Janusz Gierszewski, in turn, has drawn attention to the operational dimension of security systems, stressing that their effectiveness depends on coherent management, transparent communication, and the coordination of public and private actors (Gierszewski, 2017, pp.66-79). His analytical model underscores that the economy and the security system form a mutually dependent structure: markets require stability and predictability to function, while state institutions depend on the economy’s fiscal strength to sustain protective measures. This interdependence makes economic security both an end and an instrument – a self-referential field in which the safeguarding of value and the production of value coincide.

The sociological implication of these perspectives is that economic security cannot be separated from the social construction of risk. As Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens have observed, late modernity transforms risk from an external hazard into a constitutive element of governance and identity. In the Polish school, this insight takes on a pragmatic form:

security is not merely about defence but about adaptation - a process of continuous learning through crisis. Illegal migration, cyberattacks, and political instability are thus interpreted not only as threats to be neutralised but as tests of institutional flexibility and social cohesion.

From this theoretical standpoint, economic security appears as a multidimensional field structured by three principal logics: the logic of sovereignty, the logic of interdependence, and the logic of resilience. The logic of sovereignty refers to the state's capacity to regulate its borders, financial flows, and strategic resources. The logic of interdependence acknowledges the global nature of markets, technologies, and information systems that transcend national boundaries. The logic of resilience, finally, concerns the ability of societies to maintain functionality under stress - to anticipate, absorb, and recover from shocks without collapsing into chaos. The interplay of these three logics defines the architecture of contemporary security, where national autonomy and global integration coexist in permanent tension.

The present article proposes a sociological analysis of economic security under conditions of migratory, digital, and political turbulence. Its purpose is not to present a descriptive catalogue of risks, but to articulate a coherent interpretive framework in which the mechanisms of economic destabilisation can be understood as socially mediated processes. Illegal migration is examined as a phenomenon that not only strains labour markets and welfare systems but also serves as a tool of hybrid warfare, destabilising public trust and financial stability. Cyberattacks are analysed as a new form of economic violence - targeting the informational infrastructure that underpins transactions, banking systems, and trade. Political crises are discussed as catalysts of macroeconomic volatility, undermining investor confidence and fragmenting global supply chains, especially in the domain of rare earth minerals critical for advanced technologies.

The guiding assumption is that economic security cannot be achieved solely through technocratic regulation or military deterrence. It requires an integrative model of governance that links migration policy, cybersecurity, and financial stability under a unified strategic vision. The Polish tradition of security science, developed by Maciejewski and his colleagues, provides a conceptual foundation for such a model because it unites theoretical depth with pragmatic orientation. It insists that the economy is not an autonomous system but a domain of social relations—shaped by trust, authority, and cultural norms - and that threats to it are therefore inseparable from broader crises of legitimacy and solidarity.

This article will proceed by exploring, in turn, the three domains in which the fragility of economic security becomes most visible: illegal migration as a hybrid risk to labour and welfare systems; cyberattacks as a destabilising force in financial and industrial infrastructures; and political crises as accelerators of systemic uncertainty. Each section will show that these processes intersect in a common matrix of vulnerability, in which digital interdependence, geopolitical rivalry, and social fragmentation converge. The concluding

section will situate these findings within the global “new normal” shaped by the war in Ukraine, the U.S. - China technological rivalry, and the strategic repositioning of India and the European Union.

In the logic of contemporary sociology of security, this inquiry is not simply diagnostic but reflective: it aims to clarify how societies conceptualise and manage uncertainty. The Polish school’s insistence on human capital as the decisive factor of national security reminds us that the ultimate resource of any economy is its people - their competence, creativity, and moral responsibility. Economic security, in this sense, is not an end-state but a moral and cultural project, an ongoing negotiation between vulnerability and resilience, autonomy and interdependence, power and trust.

The theoretical perspectives outlined above provide a conceptual lens through which contemporary threats to economic security can be meaningfully interpreted. One of the most salient and multifaceted of these threats is irregular migration, which increasingly operates not only as a social or demographic phenomenon, but also as an instrument of hybrid pressure affecting economic stability.

Migration as a Hybrid Threat to Economic Security

The issue of migration has always accompanied the processes of globalisation, but in the twenty-first century it has assumed a new and distinctly strategic dimension. Illegal migration, far from being a purely humanitarian or demographic challenge, has become a factor of systemic destabilisation that penetrates the very structure of economic security. Within the European context, Poland finds itself at the intersection of two dynamics: on one hand, demographic decline and labour shortages necessitate controlled migration; on the other, the instrumentalisation of migratory flows by external actors transforms the phenomenon into a hybrid threat. In both cases, the state’s economic resilience and fiscal balance become primary fields of tension.

The economic effects of large-scale irregular migration can be observed in three interrelated domains: the labour market, the welfare system, and public finance. The first of these, the labour market, reveals the ambivalence of migration: it mitigates workforce shortages in key sectors such as construction, logistics, and agriculture, while simultaneously producing pressure on wage structures and employment standards. Janusz Gierszewski notes that the influx of irregular labour “creates segmented employment systems, in which legality itself becomes a market variable” (Gierszewski, 2017, p. 93). In this sense, illegal migration generates an informal economy that coexists with formal structures, eroding the tax base and distorting competition.

From the perspective of economic security, such distortions have long-term consequences. They weaken the redistributive functions of the state, undermine trust in institutions, and increase the burden on public finances. Marian Cieślarczyk, analysing the

ethical foundations of security systems, underlines that the erosion of fiscal integrity constitutes not only an economic risk but a moral one: "it corrodes the collective sense of justice that legitimises the fiscal system itself" (Cieślarczyk, 2011, p.75). When the social perception of fairness declines, so does willingness to contribute, creating a feedback loop of evasion and under-collection. The costs of integration, welfare assistance, and border protection then accumulate as structural deficits within state budgets.

Illegal migration also affects human capital - a category central to Polish security sociology. Małgorzata Stochmal emphasises that "a society's resilience depends on the alignment of its human capital with its institutional capacities" (Stochmal, 2020, p. 46). When migration is irregular, this alignment fails: educational systems, labour-market policy, and public administration cannot integrate new populations effectively. As a result, potential human resources are underutilised, while xenophobia and social fragmentation rise. The labour force may expand numerically but deteriorate qualitatively, as skills remain unrecognised and social capital erodes.

At the macroeconomic level, the financial consequences of uncontrolled migration manifest in higher fiscal expenditures on security, healthcare, and emergency accommodation. Recent analyses by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA Report 2024) indicate that irregular migration increased the EU's collective border-management spending by 32 percent between 2021 and 2023, while humanitarian outlays by national governments rose by 21 percent¹. For Poland, positioned along the eastern frontier of the Schengen Area, these costs are multiplied by the geopolitical context: migration pressure is often orchestrated through proxy states as part of hybrid operations.

Hybrid warfare - the coordinated use of military, informational, and migratory tactics -transforms demographic movement into an instrument of economic coercion. Jan Maciejewski interprets such phenomena through the lens of dispositional groups, noting that "when state and non-state actors use populations as tools of pressure, the social order becomes the battlefield itself" (Maciejewski, 2025, pp. 88-91). The crisis at the Polish-Belarusian border in 2021 demonstrated this mechanism with stark clarity. Migrants were mobilised not as individuals seeking refuge but as vectors of disruption targeting logistics chains, energy infrastructure, and political stability. The ensuing fiscal expenditures on border fortification, emergency healthcare, and humanitarian management reached billions of złotych, diverting resources from development programmes and public investment.

The sociological dimension of this phenomenon lies in its cumulative effect on collective trust. As Cieślarczyk and Pieczywok jointly observed in their recent monograph *Kultura bezpieczeństwa w warunkach niepewności globalnej* (2023), "the use of migration as an element of pressure undermines citizens' faith in the capacity of institutions to protect both

¹ European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), Annual Report 2024 on Asylum Trends, Brussels 2024, pp. 41–43

physical and economic security" (Cieślarczyk, Pieczywok, 2023, p. 119). When the public perceives the border as porous, it generalises that insecurity to the financial system and to the state as a whole. Market confidence, consumer optimism, and investment behaviour all deteriorate - illustrating how psychological insecurity translates directly into economic risk.

From the perspective of fiscal policy, migration-related expenditures create a dual burden: increased current spending and reduced long-term productivity. According to a 2024 report by the National Bank of Poland, the fiscal costs of border-security operations and refugee assistance amounted to 0.8 percent of GDP in 2022, while productivity growth in affected regions fell by 1.3 percent². These data confirm that hybrid migration pressures are not temporary disturbances but structural shocks with measurable economic consequences.

Moreover, the financing of migration management increasingly relies on debt instruments and EU transfers, generating dependency that further constrains fiscal sovereignty. As Stochmal argues, "security financed through external credit transforms from protection into subordination" (Stochmal, op. cit., p. 57). This statement resonates strongly in the context of Poland's evolving position within the EU's financial architecture, where solidarity funds for border management coexist with macroeconomic conditionality. Economic security thus becomes a negotiation between autonomy and interdependence – a defining feature of the contemporary European order.

In sociological terms, illegal migration can be read as a stress test for the moral economy of security. The capacity to combine humanitarian obligations with fiscal prudence becomes the criterion of state maturity. When this balance collapses, two risks emerge: the securitisation of migration (which erodes democratic legitimacy) and the politicisation of economics (which replaces rational budgeting with populist spending). Andrzej Pieczywok warns that "a security culture devoid of axiological grounding degenerates into mere technocracy or propaganda" (Pieczywok, 2015, p. 28). The challenge, therefore, lies in constructing a normative framework that integrates human rights with economic rationality, avoiding both the cynicism of utilitarianism and the paralysis of moralism.

The complexity of the problem also stems from the interaction between migration and other hybrid threats. Disinformation campaigns exploit public fears, creating economic panic, capital flight, and speculative volatility. Social media amplify narratives of crisis, triggering behavioural responses that can destabilise markets. As noted by the Institute of Economic Forecasting (Warsaw 2025), "the perception of migration as chaos produces measurable economic losses through the mechanism of consumer pessimism"³. Hence, the management

² National Bank of Poland (NBP), Economic Security and Migration Pressures: Report 2024, Warsaw 2024, pp. 12–15

³ Institute of Economic Forecasting (IEP), Perception of Migration and Economic Behaviour in Poland, Warsaw 2025, p. 6.

of migration is not only a logistical task but a communicative one: the economy depends as much on trust as on capital.

The intersection of migration and hybrid warfare thus redefines the parameters of economic security. It demands coordination among ministries of finance, interior, and defence; alignment between fiscal discipline and social inclusion; and strategic investment in border technology, labour-market regulation, and social integration. Above all, it requires a security culture — in the sense developed by Pieczywok and Cieślarczyk — that perceives the economy not as an isolated system but as a living organism whose vitality depends on ethical integrity and civic cohesion.

Illegal migration, when analysed through this lens, appears as both a threat and a mirror: it exposes the fragility of the economic system while revealing its moral foundations. The response to it will determine not only the stability of state budgets but the very legitimacy of governance in an era of interdependent crises.

While migration-related pressures expose the social and fiscal vulnerabilities of economic systems, they do not exhaust the spectrum of hybrid threats shaping contemporary insecurity. An equally destabilising factor emerges in the digital domain, where cyberattacks target the informational infrastructure upon which modern economies depend.

Cyberattacks and Cyberthreats as Factors of Economic Destabilisation

If the economy of the twentieth century depended on the flow of goods, the economy of the twenty-first depends on the flow of information. Financial systems, energy grids, transport logistics, and supply chains are all mediated by digital technologies. Consequently, the primary vulnerability of contemporary economies no longer lies in their material production but in their informational architecture. A single cyberattack can paralyse entire markets, distort exchange rates, or destroy the credibility of public institutions. As Małgorzata Stochmal notes, “information has become the critical infrastructure of security, and its disturbance is equivalent to the disruption of the state itself” (Stochmal, 2020, p. 58).

The growing frequency and sophistication of cyberattacks have revealed that economic security must now be conceptualised as cyber-economic security: a composite of financial resilience, digital protection, and institutional trust. Poland, like other European countries, has experienced a steady escalation of cyber incidents targeting banking systems, government platforms, and strategic industries. According to the 2024 National Cybersecurity Report of the Ministry of Digital Affairs, the number of financially motivated cyberattacks increased by 37 percent in 2023 compared to the previous year.⁴ These attacks include ransomware assaults on small and medium enterprises, phishing campaigns targeting online banking users, and data breaches affecting public institutions.

⁴ Ministry of Digital Affairs, National Cybersecurity Report 2024, Warsaw 2024, pp. 9–11.

The economic implications of such incidents are both direct and systemic. Direct losses include ransom payments, data restoration costs, and service interruptions. Systemic losses, however, manifest as erosion of trust in financial institutions and payment systems - what sociologists of security term symbolic destabilisation. Janusz Gierszewski emphasises that "the financial market functions as a trust system; its collapse does not begin with bankruptcy but with disbelief" (Gierszewski, 2017, p. 122). Once trust erodes, liquidity and investment decline, triggering fiscal instability and social anxiety.

Cyberattacks on financial systems often function as strategic tools of hybrid warfare. They blur the boundary between economic competition and political hostility. In 2022–2023, Polish financial institutions were repeatedly targeted by cyber operations traced to state-sponsored groups linked to Russia and Belarus. The purpose of these attacks was not simply monetary gain but psychological destabilisation - to undermine confidence in the state's ability to safeguard digital sovereignty. In this context, economic security and cybersecurity converge: the digital battlefield becomes an arena where fiscal stability and national credibility are contested simultaneously.

From a sociological perspective, cyberattacks operate as mechanisms of symbolic violence in the Bourdieusian sense: they manipulate the cognitive and emotional environment of societies rather than their material base. They exploit the modern individual's dependence on digital tools - banking apps, e-commerce, social networks - to generate a pervasive sense of vulnerability. As Cieślarczyk argues, "the loss of informational security induces not only financial anxiety but existential uncertainty, undermining the moral order on which economic cooperation rests" (Cieślarczyk, 2011, p. 104).

In response, the Polish school of security studies emphasises the cultivation of security culture as a prerequisite for digital resilience. Andrzej Pieczywok defines security culture as "a set of values and practices that condition the rational use of technology and the responsible management of risk" (Pieczywok, 2015, p. 39). This concept underscores that cybersecurity cannot rely solely on technical defence systems; it requires human and organisational maturity. Training programmes, ethical standards, and institutional transparency form the social infrastructure of cyber-resilience.

In the economic sphere, this translates into the creation of adaptive systems that can anticipate, absorb, and recover from digital shocks. The European Central Bank's 2024 Cyber Resilience Report emphasises that financial institutions must develop "redundancy and continuity protocols that treat cyberattacks as inevitable, not exceptional".⁵ Polish banks, particularly those integrated into European payment systems, have begun implementing such frameworks, guided by the EU's Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), which entered into force in 2025. Yet compliance remains uneven, especially among smaller institutions lacking financial or human resources.

⁵ European Central Bank, Cyber Resilience Report, Frankfurt 2024, pp. 17–20.

The sociological challenge lies in integrating these technical standards with public consciousness. As Stochmal points out, “technological resilience without social awareness is like a wall without a foundation”. (Stochmal, op. cit., p. 64) Public education in cybersecurity - from schools to workplaces - is therefore an essential component of economic security. The Ministry of Education’s 2025 Cyber Literacy Strategy seeks to embed such education across curricula, reflecting an awareness that digital competence is now as fundamental as literacy itself.

Cyberattacks also expose the geopolitical dimension of economic vulnerability. In the post-pandemic period, global supply chains have become targets of digital espionage and sabotage. Attacks on semiconductor producers, energy distributors, and logistics software providers demonstrate that control over information equates to control over resources. Maciejewski’s theory of dispositional groups helps interpret this dynamic: in cyberspace, traditional military hierarchies dissolve into flexible, transnational networks capable of rapid offensive or defensive adaptation. (Maciejewski, 2025, pp. 111-114) These networks – whether state-based or criminal – function as “digital armies,” operating in the grey zone between legality and warfare.

In Poland, the 2023 ransomware attack on the Poczta Polska logistics system disrupted financial transactions and delivery chains for several days, causing measurable economic losses estimated at 0.04 percent of GDP.⁶ The incident demonstrated that even peripheral institutions within the economic system can become points of strategic vulnerability. Sociologically, such cases reveal the interdependence of micro and macro processes: the failure of one node triggers cascading effects across entire networks of trust, supply, and payment.

The human dimension of cyberattacks is equally important. Research by the Institute for Security Culture and Digital Ethics (Warsaw, 2024) shows that employees remain the weakest link in digital protection. Over 60 percent of successful cyber intrusions in Poland originate from social engineering – manipulation rather than hacking⁷. This confirms that economic security depends not merely on encryption or firewalls but on the ethical discipline and situational awareness of individuals. The digital battlefield, in this sense, is primarily sociological: a struggle for attention, perception, and moral vigilance.

In the financial sector, central banks face a paradox: the more they digitalise, the more vulnerable they become. The introduction of digital currencies and algorithmic trading increases efficiency but simultaneously creates systemic fragility. The Polish National Bank’s 2025 analysis warns that “algorithmic interdependencies can amplify minor cyber incidents into macroeconomic disturbances”.⁸ The interconnectivity of trading systems, clearing

⁶ Polish Economic Institute, Cyber Incident Economic Impact Study 2023, Warsaw 2024, p. 7.

⁷ Institute for Security Culture and Digital Ethics, Human Factors in Cybersecurity, Warsaw 2024, p. 15.

⁸ National Bank of Poland, Algorithmic Finance and Cyber Risk, Warsaw 2025, p. 23.

houses, and fintech platforms thus turns economic modernisation into a double-edged sword – enhancing competitiveness while multiplying risks.

The theoretical synthesis offered by Cieślarczyk and Gierszewski suggests that economic security in the digital age must integrate three levels: technological infrastructure, organisational adaptability, and cultural trust. Each failure – technical, bureaucratic, or moral – opens a gate for destabilisation. Therefore, policies focused exclusively on cybersecurity technology without attention to institutional ethics or public education risk creating what Stochmal calls “a defensive illusion” (Stochmal, op. cit., p. 72). The economy remains exposed not because of insufficient tools but because of insufficient culture.

Finally, the sociological implications of cyberthreats extend beyond economics. They shape the emotional climate of societies, reinforcing feelings of precariousness and control loss. These affective states, in turn, influence consumption, savings, and investment behaviour. As Pieczywok warns, “the economy of fear precedes the economy of loss” (Pieczywok, 2015, p. 45). Hence, cultivating resilience means not only defending networks but restoring confidence – a psychological and moral project as much as a technical one.

Cyberattacks reveal the deep interdependence of security, economy, and social consciousness. They expose the paradox of digital modernity: that progress itself produces new vulnerabilities. In this sense, cyber-resilience becomes a metaphor for the entire security system – a constant process of learning, adaptation, and moral reconstruction within a fragile global order.

Although cyberthreats primarily operate within the digital and financial infrastructure of the economy, their effects are deeply entangled with broader political dynamics. In this sense, cyber insecurity intersects with political crises, which amplify economic volatility and transform uncertainty into a systemic condition of governance.

Political Crises and Financial and Monetary Stability

Political crises have always had economic consequences, yet in the globalised and digitalised world of the twenty-first century they have become triggers of systemic financial turbulence. The modern economy operates under conditions of interdependence so dense that the volatility of one political centre can generate reverberations across continents. In such circumstances, economic security must be analysed not merely as the stability of national markets but as the capacity to manage interlinked crises that are simultaneously fiscal, monetary, and political.

In the Polish school of security studies, Jan Maciejewski defines dispositional systems as institutional structures that “must maintain equilibrium under conditions of uncertainty by transforming potential chaos into controlled adaptation” (Maciejewski, 2025, p. 143). This definition applies with particular force to the relationship between political decision-making and financial governance. Monetary institutions such as central banks act as dispositional

groups of the economy: their task is to preserve trust in the value of money despite political oscillations. Yet, as recent years have shown, that trust is fragile.

Between 2020 and 2024, the world economy faced a concatenation of crises – pandemic disruption, Russia's aggression against Ukraine, energy price shocks, and growing rivalry between the United States and China. Each episode revealed the sensitivity of open market operations (OMOs) – the key instrument of central banks for controlling liquidity – to geopolitical uncertainty. When political risk rises, OMOs cease to be a purely technical tool and become instruments of strategic communication. Their effectiveness depends less on quantitative ratios than on the credibility of policy and the cohesion of institutions. As Janusz Gierszewski observes, “economic security is first a matter of confidence, and confidence is a political product” (Gierszewski, 2017, p. 156).

The war in Ukraine provides a paradigmatic example. The Polish National Bank (NBP) faced unprecedented pressure to stabilise the złoty, control inflation, and simultaneously finance state expenditure on defence and humanitarian support. Each decision regarding bond purchases or interest-rate adjustments was interpreted by markets through the prism of political risk. According to the NBP's 2024 Report on Monetary Stability, fluctuations in sovereign-bond yields were three times more sensitive to geopolitical events than to macroeconomic indicators.⁹ The implication is clear: in times of political crisis, monetary instruments become channels through which insecurity is transmitted rather than neutralised.

From a sociological standpoint, this dynamic exemplifies what Małgorzata Stochmal calls “the reflexivity of risk in security systems” (Stochmal, 2020, p. 81). Political crises do not simply affect economies externally; they are internalised as expectations, anxieties, and anticipatory behaviours within markets. Investors act on perceptions of instability, thereby materialising the very risks they fear. The self-fulfilling nature of financial panic transforms subjective uncertainty into objective volatility. Thus, the sociology of security must complement economic analysis: it explains why rational policies may fail when collective trust disintegrates.

The interconnection between political credibility and monetary stability is particularly visible in the domain of open market operations. These consist of central-bank purchases and sales of government securities designed to regulate money supply. In stable conditions, OMOs provide liquidity and signal confidence. Under political duress, however, they risk being perceived as emergency measures, eroding rather than restoring faith. The European Central Bank's 2023 review of post-pandemic operations notes that “repeated interventions under uncertain political governance produce diminishing marginal trust effects”.¹⁰ In other words, when political conflict dominates fiscal policy, even correct monetary instruments lose symbolic power.

⁹ National Bank of Poland (NBP), Report on Monetary Stability 2024, Warsaw 2024, pp. 5–8.

¹⁰ European Central Bank, Post-Pandemic OMOs Review, Frankfurt 2023, p. 19.

For Poland, a country structurally embedded in the European Union's financial ecosystem yet exposed to eastern geopolitical turbulence, the coordination of monetary and political strategies has become a key determinant of economic security. Marian Cieślarczyk underlines that "systemic resilience depends on the moral and cognitive integration of decision-makers; a state cannot protect its currency if its elites are divided by short-term interests". (Cieślarczyk, 2011, p. 119) The institutional fragmentation observable in many democracies - oscillating coalitions, populist cycles, politicisation of central banks - directly threatens macroeconomic coherence.

Global financial flows amplify these vulnerabilities. The instantaneous mobility of capital allows investors to react to political signals within seconds. As the IMF's World Economic Outlook 2024 reports, political-risk variables accounted for nearly 40 percent of cross-border capital-flow volatility in emerging Europe¹¹. Economic security, therefore, becomes hostage to the narrative discipline of governments. A single tweet by a political leader, a corruption scandal, or a sudden change of coalition can trigger speculative movements that outweigh the effects of months of prudent economic management.

This fragility has structural causes. The financialisation of the global economy has created a situation in which symbolic indicators – credit ratings, forecasts, political statements – exert greater influence than material production. As Pieczywok warns, "when meaning governs money, the ethical deficit of politics becomes an economic hazard". (Pieczywok, 2015, p. 51). Political crises thus threaten not only fiscal balances but the moral architecture of capitalism itself.

At the operational level, central banks have attempted to counteract these pressures through expanded OMOs and quantitative-easing measures. Yet, as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS Report 2023) observes, such policies entail a paradox: "the more liquidity central banks inject to offset political risk, the more markets become dependent on political stability"¹². The economy enters a cycle of addiction to reassurance, in which every new crisis demands stronger intervention. This mechanism transforms the state into both guarantor and prisoner of financial expectations.

The sociological dimension of this process is crucial. Trust, once eroded, cannot be restored by decree; it must be rebuilt through consistent communication and symbolic credibility. Stochmal and Gierszewski in their 2024 paper Economic Governance and Social Resilience argue that "economic security is co-produced by narratives of stability - monetary policy is therefore a form of social pedagogy". (Stochmal, Gierszewski, 2024, p. 14) The state must teach society how to interpret uncertainty, transforming panic into patience.

¹¹ International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook 2024, Washington 2024, p. 67.

¹² Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Annual Economic Report 2023, Basel 2023, p. 32.

In the Polish context, political polarisation remains a latent threat to such pedagogical coherence. Changes in fiscal priorities accompanying electoral cycles often undermine long-term investment policy. The 2024 Polish Economic Forum report notes that private investment growth in Poland was 2.1 percent lower in election years than in non-election years¹³. This correlation underscores the cost of political volatility: it depresses innovation, weakens capital formation, and slows adaptation to technological change – all fundamental pillars of economic security.

Globally, the rivalry between the United States and China, the growing role of India, and the strategic repositioning of the European Union have intensified this interdependence. The weaponisation of trade, the politicisation of rare-earth-mineral supply chains, and the emergence of “economic blocs of trust” indicate that political crises are no longer episodic but structural features of the international order. The OECD’s Security and Markets Report 2025 predicts that by 2030, 20 percent of global trade will occur within politically aligned blocs rather than through open markets¹⁴. Such fragmentation challenges the liberal vision of a self-regulating global economy and demands a new sociological understanding of interdependence.

Within this reconfigured landscape, economic security requires both diversification and resilience. Poland’s growing engagement with EU energy policy, transatlantic defence cooperation, and Asian investment flows illustrates how middle powers navigate between dependence and autonomy. As Cieślarczyk reminds, “the real measure of sovereignty is not isolation but the capacity to cooperate without subordination”. (Cieślarczyk, 2011, p. 125)

Ultimately, political crises function as stress tests for the moral and institutional cohesion of societies. Their economic effects are not limited to GDP fluctuations; they reveal the depth of social trust, the maturity of governance, and the quality of leadership. The sociology of security, building on the works of Maciejewski and his successors, teaches that crises can also be opportunities for renewal – moments when collective reflection replaces routine. Economic security in such conditions becomes not a shield but a process of continuous self-correction, sustained by transparency, solidarity, and disciplined optimism.

The economic consequences of political crises cannot be fully understood in isolation from the wider transformations of the international system. These crises unfold within an emerging global order characterised by strategic rivalry, fragmented supply chains, and the growing politicisation of economic interdependence.

¹³ Polish Economic Forum, Investment and Political Cycles Report 2024, Warsaw 2024, p. 9.

¹⁴ OECD, Security and Markets Report 2025, Paris 2025, p. 23.

The New Global Order and Its Implications for Economic Security

The multifaceted processes examined above - irregular migration, cyberattacks, and political crises - converge within a single analytical horizon: the reconfiguration of global economic security in the early twenty-first century. In this horizon, security is no longer a peripheral condition of prosperity but its very foundation. Without institutional credibility, technological resilience, and social trust, economic systems fragment under the pressure of global turbulence. The Polish school of security studies – from Maciejewski's theory of dispositional groups to Stochmal's systemic-risk analysis and Cieślarczyk's axiological concept of resilience – provides a conceptual architecture capable of explaining this transformation.

The war in Ukraine, more than any recent event, has exposed the interdependence of military, political, and economic domains. Beyond the humanitarian catastrophe and geopolitical upheaval, the conflict has produced deep structural shifts in energy markets, food supply chains, and fiscal policies across Europe. Poland's role as a logistical and humanitarian hub has revealed both the strength and fragility of its economic-security system. On one hand, defence-related spending and international aid have stimulated industrial production; on the other, the reallocation of resources and rising inflation have constrained fiscal flexibility. According to the NBP Economic Outlook 2025, the cumulative cost of war-related expenditures between 2022 and 2024 reached nearly 3 percent of Poland's GDP¹⁵.

Yet, as Janusz Gierszewski reminds, "security costs are not losses when they strengthen systemic adaptability". (Gierszewski, 2017, p. 168) The investment in border infrastructure, energy diversification, and digital protection has accelerated Poland's strategic autonomy. Nevertheless, these advances remain conditioned by broader geopolitical tensions, particularly those between the United States and China. The emerging bipolarity of the global economy – centred on technological ecosystems and rare-earth mineral supply chains – has forced medium-sized states to navigate complex dependencies.

China's growing dominance in rare-earth markets, essential for electronics, defence, and renewable-energy technologies, poses a long-term challenge to economic sovereignty. The OECD Strategic Minerals Report 2024 notes that the PRC controls nearly 60 percent of global rare-earth processing capacity¹⁶. This concentration transforms materials into instruments of political leverage. As Cieślarczyk observes, "control over resources today functions as control over possibilities". (Cieślarczyk, 2011, p. 132) The ability to access, refine, and recycle these minerals will determine the technological and security position of states throughout the coming decade.

The United States, responding through the CHIPS and Science Act and strategic partnerships with allies, seeks to maintain technological primacy. Poland's participation in the

¹⁵ National Bank of Poland, Economic Outlook 2025, Warsaw 2025, p. 7.

¹⁶ Strategic Minerals Report 2024, Paris 2024, p. 11.

EU's Critical Raw Materials Alliance (2024) situates it within a European effort to balance these asymmetries. However, as Małgorzata Stochmal warns, "autonomy pursued through fragmentation risks creating islands of security amid oceans of dependency". (Stochmal, 2020, p. 93) The European Union must therefore integrate industrial policy with social cohesion - ensuring that economic resilience does not degenerate into protectionism.

India's ascent adds another layer of complexity. As a demographic and technological power, it occupies an intermediate position between the Western and Chinese blocs. Its expanding cooperation with the EU and Poland in sectors such as IT and pharmaceuticals signals the formation of a multipolar economic-security architecture. This diversification mitigates risk but also multiplies strategic calculations: interdependence now demands continuous negotiation rather than stable alignment.

From a sociological perspective, these global shifts redefine the meaning of economic resilience. It is no longer sufficient to maintain fiscal stability; states must cultivate adaptive intelligence — the collective capacity to reinterpret crises as opportunities. Cieślarczyk and Pieczywok, in their 2023 study *Kultura bezpieczeństwa w warunkach niepewności globalnej*, describe resilience as "the moral and cognitive ability to transform uncertainty into learning". (Cieślarczyk, A. Pieczywok, 2023, p. 142) Economic security thus depends not solely on the abundance of resources but on the quality of collective reasoning.

This insight has direct implications for Poland and other medium-sized economies. In an environment of accelerating digitalisation, demographic change, and ecological pressure, security must be reimagined as a multilevel ecosystem. Migration, cyberthreats, and political volatility are not discrete variables but interacting feedback loops. Their convergence requires what Stochmal calls "integrated strategic governance" — a coordination of economic, informational, and social subsystems under a shared normative vision. (Stochmal, op. cit., p. 101)

The normative dimension is essential. As Andrzej Pieczywok emphasises, "without axiological integration, the security system becomes efficient yet blind". (Pieczywok, 2015. P. 53) The defence of markets, currencies, and technologies must be guided by ethical coherence - respect for human dignity, legal order, and intergenerational responsibility. In the absence of such grounding, even the most sophisticated systems succumb to cynicism and opportunism, which ultimately erode the trust on which economies rest.

From this vantage point, the sociology of security reveals its full analytical potential. It shows that the economy is not an autonomous machine but a social contract maintained by confidence and recognition. Illegal migration, cybercrime, and political conflict each threaten this contract in distinct ways: by disrupting labour markets, corrupting informational networks, or discrediting governance. Yet, they also expose the pathways to renewal. Each crisis can strengthen institutional reflexivity and moral solidarity - if interpreted not as disaster but as feedback.

Looking forward, three challenges will determine the trajectory of economic security. First, the management of energy and mineral dependencies, requiring new partnerships and technological innovation. Second, the establishment of digital sovereignty - ensuring control over data, infrastructure, and algorithms. Third, the reconstruction of social capital eroded by populism, inequality, and disinformation. These tasks are interdependent: no algorithm can secure a society that distrusts its institutions, and no policy can succeed without public participation.

The war in Ukraine will remain the defining context for Europe's security culture. It has reminded societies that prosperity without preparedness is an illusion. Yet, it has also demonstrated that resilience is cumulative: every reform in education, energy, and governance strengthens deterrence. As Gierszewski concludes, "the front line of modern security runs through the economy, but its foundation lies in ethics". (Gierszewski, op. cit., p. 172)

The interactions between migration pressures, cyberthreats, and political instability thus converge into a coherent pattern of systemic risk. This convergence calls for a synthetic assessment of economic security, one that moves beyond sectoral analysis toward an integrated sociological interpretation.

CONCLUSION

In sum, *economic security in the face of migration, cyberattacks, and political crises* is not a technocratic agenda but a civilisational choice. It demands the integration of financial rationality with moral responsibility, global cooperation with national sovereignty, and technological innovation with human solidarity. The Polish contribution to security science, deeply rooted in sociological reflection and axiological realism, offers precisely this synthesis. It reminds us that the economy, like the state itself, survives not through fear of loss but through the discipline of trust.

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mgr Łukasz Bojarski
ORCID 0009-0002-9621-4603
PhD student
Institute of International and Security Studies
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Wrocław